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Ambivalence refers to a psychological conflict between opposing evaluations, often
experienced as being torn between alternatives. This dynamic aspect of ambivalence
is hard to capture with outcome-focused measures, such as response times or self-
report. To gain more insight into ambivalence as it unfolds, the current work uses
an embodied measure of pull, drawing on research in dynamic systems. In three
studies, using different materials, we tracked people’s mouse movements as they
chose between negative and positive evaluations of attitude objects. When participants
evaluated ambivalent attitude objects, their mouse trajectories showed more pull of
the non-chosen evaluative option than when they evaluated univalent attitude objects,
revealing that participants were literally torn between the two opposing evaluations. We
address the relationship of this dynamic measure to response time and self-reports of
ambivalence and discuss implications and avenues for future research.
Keywords: ambivalence, evaluation, embodiment, attitudes, mixed feelings
Introduction
Imagine walking across campus after a long day of work. While you are heading to the train station,
you notice a fast-food truck. While your preference for the ease of a quick and tasty snack might
pull you toward the truck, your aversion to unhealthy foods may pull you away from it. And even
though you keep heading for the train, your ﬁnal path may show a curve, reﬂecting the pull of the
fast-food truck.
The psychological state of being torn between opposing evaluations, or ambivalence, is an
inescapable part of human life. People can be ambivalent about a wide range of topics including
fast food, abortion, out-group members, organ donation, euthanasia, and alcohol (for overviews,
see Sparks et al., 2001; van Harreveld et al., 2009b, 2014). Ambivalence exerts a pervasive inﬂuence
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on people’s emotions (e.g., vanHarreveld et al., 2009a) and shapes
how people process information and solve problems (e.g., Maio
et al., 1996; Jonas et al., 1997; Nordgren et al., 2006; Rees et al.,
2013; van Harreveld et al., 2014).
Conceptually, ambivalence involves a psychological conﬂict
between opposing implicit or explicit evaluations about an
attitude object (e.g., Meehl, 1964 [in Emmons, 1996]; Kaplan,
1972; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Thompson et al., 1995; Wegener
et al., 1995; Priester and Petty, 1996; van Harreveld et al.,
2009b; Petty et al., 2012). Ambivalence is thus not the same
as feeling neutral or indiﬀerent toward an attitude object, but
is characterized by simultaneously having strong positive and
negative associations (de Liver et al., 2007). The idea of conﬂict
between evaluations implies that ambivalence is inherently
dynamic and the resolution of the conﬂict is a process that evolves
over time.
How might behavioral scientists be able to assess this
psychological tug-of-war between opposing evaluations? Most
indices of ambivalence are either assessed after an evaluation
(i.e., response time based measures) or rely on people’s subjective
assessment of their psychological state (i.e., self-report based
measures), both of which may have their limitations. Whereas
the former presents us with the problem of a black box (i.e., we
cannot know what goes on during the formation of the response),
the latter relies on people’s (often biased) insight into their own
thoughts and feeling. Below, we discuss both approaches in
turn.
Self-report based measures of ambivalence ask how conﬂicted
individuals feel (e.g., Priester and Petty, 1996) or calculate
ambivalence from separate positive and negative evaluations
(e.g., Kaplan, 1972; Thompson et al., 1995; Larsen et al., 2009)
or the number of positive and negative thoughts people are
able to report about an ambivalent topic (e.g., van Harreveld
et al., 2014). As such, they are informative about people’s
subjective evaluations and the conﬂict between them. However,
people may lack insight into their own thoughts and feelings.
Consequently, self-report based measures may not tap into
implicit forms of ambivalence (e.g., Petty et al., 2012). Moreover,
assessing ambivalence through self-report based indices may
cause the construct to become salient and thereby change
the experience or evaluative process (see Schneider et al.,
unpublished manuscript). Finally, explicit measures may be
aﬀected by cultural and social factors that render people reluctant
to explicitly report their ambivalence (e.g., Cavazza and Butera,
2008), especially on controversial matters such as abortion or
euthanasia.
Researchers have also inferred ambivalence from response
times (e.g., Fazio et al., 1986; Bargh et al., 1992), bypassing
the problems associated with self-report. For instance, slower
evaluation times may be interpreted as indicative of the cognitive
competition between opposing evaluations because opposing
evaluations take longer to integrate (Bargh et al., 1992; van
Harreveld et al., 2004; Petty et al., 2006). The beneﬁts of
this approach are that it takes into account the inﬂuence of
both implicit and explicit evaluations and does not rely on
peoples’ subjective assessments of, and evaluations about, their
ambivalence. However, response times only provide information
after an evaluation is complete. As such, they do not inform
researchers about the preceding stages of the evaluation process
that lead to faster or slower responding (e.g., Schwarz and
Bohner, 2001). It is therefore diﬃcult to make strong claims
about what underlies prolonged response times. For instance,
slower responses may be the result of decreased accessibility (e.g.,
Fazio et al., 1986; Higgins, 1996), consideration of alternatives,
behavioral inhibition due to conﬂict (Gray and McNaughton,
2000; see also Corr, 2013), or even decreased positive aﬀect (Kuhl
and Kazen, 1999). As a consequence, very little is known about
how ambivalence unfolds during evaluation.
Thus, although ambivalence can be understood as a tug-of-
war between evaluations, to our knowledge, no research has
systematically addressed the dynamic evaluative processes that
underlie ambivalence. The present research begins to ﬁll this gap.
Drawing on an approach developed in dynamic systems research,
we propose thatmotor outputs during the evaluation process may
provide a window into the unfolding of ambivalent evaluations.
Evaluation and Motor Output
Research has shown that motor output can readily reveal people’s
evaluative stance toward attitude objects. For instance, subtle
changes in speciﬁc muscles in the face (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 1986)
or in posture (Hillman et al., 2004; Eerland et al., 2012; Schneider
et al., 2013) can reveal positive and negative evaluations toward
an attitude object (see also Niedenthal et al., 2005). However, not
only the end state, but also the unfolding of evaluations as they
form is observable in overt motor behavior. During the formation
of an attitude, associated evaluations rise and fall in activation
until one holds sway long enough to become the ﬁnal judgment
(Wojnowicz et al., 2009). Because the sensorimotor circuits
responsible for executing actions are also involved in deciding
which action to take, information from high level processing
overﬂows to pre motor cortices (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010). Thus,
whenever an evaluation is dominant, even for a short period of
time, the accompanying motor response is also activated, and
visible in overt behavior (e.g., Freeman et al., 2011).
As a consequence, ongoing mental processes can be observed
in even simple behaviors, such as mouse movements on a
computer screen. In the mouse tracking paradigm people engage
in a computer task in which they perform certain actions,
for instance categorization of human faces as male or female,
by moving their mouse toward speciﬁc response locations on
the screen. While they do so, the path of their mouse is
traced and recorded. The characteristics of the trajectories,
such as its curvature for instance, can be used to give insight
into evaluative conﬂict while people are performing their task
(Freeman and Ambady, 2010, for an overview see Freeman et al.,
2011), resembling our opening example of the walking trajectory
resulting from the pull of the food truck and the avoidance
of unhealthy snacks. Such an approach has not been used in
ambivalence research, but it has been successfully applied in other
domains.
For instance, in stereotyping research, when people were asked
to evaluate whether masculine or female faces ﬁtted a speciﬁc
trait by dragging the mouse over the screen to a certain response,
arm movements showed pull to both responses when the face
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was both masculine and feminine (Freeman and Ambady, 2009).
In other words, people’s movements while choosing between the
stereotypical female and the stereotypical male traits shown on
screen revealed the conﬂict between femininity and masculinity
in response to the stimulus. Likewise, mouse trajectories have
been used to reveal implicit racial bias: When people indicated
they ‘liked’ (vs. ‘disliked’) black people, peoples arm movements
moved both to the dislike response and the like response when
‘liking’ black people, but less so when they indicated they ‘liked’
white people (Wojnowicz et al., 2009).
The Present Studies
Capitalizing on the embodied expression of ongoing evaluations,
we conducted three studies in which we employed a mouse
tracker paradigm, allowing us to assess motor output during an
evaluative task. In accordance with previous operationalizations
of cognitive competition (Wojnowicz et al., 2009; Freeman and
Ambady, 2010) we used the extent to which the curvature of
participants’ mouse trajectory deviated toward the unselected
response (Maximum Deviation, MD, cf. Wojnowicz et al., 2009)
as a measure of pull of opposing evaluations. To illustrate, a
univalent topic with only negative or only positive evaluations
associated with it, is expected to yield a relatively straight line
from the start button to the response button. An ambivalent
topic with both negative and positive evaluations is expected to
show a line that is partially pulled to both response options,
creating a more curved line. This measure of pull is indicative
for the degree of conﬂict and cognitive competition between
evaluations (e.g., Freeman and Ambady, 2010). We expected
that pull of the opposing evaluation (as measured by MD)
would be greater for ambivalent compared to univalent attitude
objects. Such a ﬁnding would not only add to the literature
on ambivalence, showing that ambivalent evaluation can be
captured in an embodied way, but also add to the mouse
tracking literature by extending the paradigm into the domain of
attitudinal ambivalence.
It is worth noting that one earlier study has related mouse
locations on a computer screen to assess mixed feelings toward
a target person (Vallacher et al., 1994). Although at ﬁrst sight,
this may seem similar to the mouse tracking paradigm used
here, the procedure relied on participants’ insight in their feelings
frommoment to moment, reﬂecting the end products of repeated
evaluations. More speciﬁcally, participants were instructed to use
the location of the mouse pointer relative to a target on screen to
indicate changes in their explicit evaluationwith regard to a target
person. Over a period of 2 minutes, participants were to move
closer to the target when they felt more positive andmove further
away when they felt more negative. This pioneering work showed
that when people have mixed feelings toward target person, they
more often change locations, and this does not diminish over
time. This indeed captures one aspect of the dynamic nature
of ambivalence, namely, attitude inconsistency. In other words,
these ﬁndings show that people’s ambivalent attitudes give rise
to diﬀerent evaluations at diﬀerent time points. Instead, in the
present research, we looked at motor output that does not rely
on introspection and assesses conﬂict as it dynamically unfolds
during evaluation.
Aside from our primary measure of pull, we also assessed
response times. As noted above, previous work found that people
take longer to evaluate ambivalent attitude objects, compared
to non-ambivalent attitude objects (e.g., Bargh et al., 1992; van
Harreveld et al., 2004; de Liver et al., 2007). Measuring response
times allowed us to explore possible correlations to online
processes of ambivalence, self-report measures, and response
times. For exploratory purposes we also looked at the moment
in time in which pull was largest.
In all studies, we report all manipulations, all participants and
exclusions, and all dependent measures. To reduce the inﬂuence
of outlier responses, latencies under 300 ms as well as above
3,000 ms were excluded from analyses in all studies, however,
including these observations did not alter our results. Cohen’s dz
eﬀect sizes (standardized mean diﬀerence between two groups
of dependent observations, Cohen, 1988) and 95% conﬁdence
intervals around the eﬀect size are calculated using a procedure
developed by Wuensch (2012). Additionally, we also report η2p.
For all experiments, the number of participants was determined
by the amount of scheduled lab time that was available to
the experimenter, but was always at least 30 participants. This
number gave us enough power to detect small to medium eﬀects
in complete within subjects design experiments.
Study 1
Method
Participants and Design
Forty-nine students (34 females, 3 unreported, Mage = 22,
SDage = 3) participated for course credit or monetary reward.
The experiment followed a one-factor (valence: ambivalent vs.
univalent) within-subjects design with pull (operationalized as
the degree to which the curvature of the trajectory deviated
toward the unselected response, or MD) as main dependent
variable. All participants signed an informed consent form. In the
same session, we also collected data involving evaluations of then
current Dutch politicians and aﬀectively laden pictures, which are
not related to the current project and not reported further.
Attitude Objects
We used 12 attitude objects that have successfully been used
in prior research to induce ambivalence (de Liver et al., 2007;
Schneider et al., 2013; van Harreveld et al., 2014). The ambivalent
topics were: abortion, organ donation, euthanasia, and alcohol.
The univalent topics were: happy, holiday, in love (in Dutch this
is one word), sunshine, abuse, depressed, disgust, and unhappy.
Initially we also included four attitude objects with which we had
no previous experience. These attitude objects were: me, future,
sports, and blood donation. However, after inspection of explicit
ratings, we decided not to include these attitude objects in the
current analyses, as they were not rated as ambivalent by our
participants.
Evaluation Task
Upon entering the lab, participants were seated in individual
cubicles. All instructions were computer-administered. In the
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ﬁrst part of the experiment, participants were asked to evaluate
diﬀerent words as positive or negative. Participants were
instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. At the
start of each trial, a start button appeared at the bottom center
of the screen and the response options (positive and negative)
appeared in the top left and top right corner of the screen. When
participants clicked the start button at the center bottom of the
screen, the cursor was relocated to the center starting position
(to ensure all trajectories start from the same location) and the
attitude object appeared. Participants then moved the mouse to
one of the two response buttons located in the top right and top
left of the screen. After this, the attitude object disappeared and a
new trial started.
At the start of the experiment, participants completed two
neutral practice trials to familiarize themselves with the task. Each
participant evaluated each attitude object twice in two separate
blocks of trials, including 12 attitude objects each, resulting in 24
trials. In each block, all attitude objects were presented once, in
a random order. The location of the positive and the negative
response option was reversed between blocks. Unfortunately,
due to a technical error, only one counterbalancing condition
functioned, and block order was not counterbalanced. For all
participants, in the ﬁrst block, the positive response option
appeared on the right and the negative on the left. In the second
block, this location was reversed and the negative response option
appeared on the left and the positive response option on the right.
During each trial, streaming x and y coordinates of
the computer mouse were recorded at a sampling rate of
approximately 70 Hz. Participants’ response times (the time
between stimulus onset and ﬁnal click) were also unobtrusively
recorded. To record, process, and analyze mouse trajectories,
we used the validated MouseTracker software package, which
includes modules for recording and analyzing mouse trajectories
reliably (Freeman and Ambady, 2010). All trajectories were
rescaled into a standard coordinate space (top left: x, y = [1,
1.5]; bottom right: x, y = [1, 0]). Because trials diﬀered in
their length, raw trajectories were normalized into 101 time
steps using linear interpolation so that all trials had the same
amount of time steps and could be averaged. To obtain an index
of the degree to which there was pull toward the eventually
non-chosen evaluation, we calculated MD as follows. First, an
idealized response trajectory (i.e., a straight line between each
trajectory’s start point and endpoint) was computed. TheMDwas
then calculated as the largest perpendicular deviation between
the realized trajectory and its idealized trajectory. MDs were
then averaged over stimuli, trials, and conditions. Higher MDs
indicated more deviation from the idealized trajectory toward
the unselected alternative and more pull. Apart from MD, it
is also possible to measure the area under the curve (AUC),
which refers to the geometric area between the actual trajectory
and the ideal trajectory (i.e., straight line) and is also an index
of pull. In general, for the same data, MD and AUC do not
give substantially diﬀerent results (Freeman and Ambady, 2010).
In line with this, assessing AUC instead of MD did not alter
the results of our studies, and AUC and MD showed a strong
positive correlation (r = 0.97, p < 0.001 for Study 1, r = 0.96,
p < 0.001, in Study 2, and r = 0.90, p < 0.001, in Study 3), thus
in the remainder of the manuscript we present results for MD
only.
Ambivalence
Ambivalence was measured with three established measures
of ambivalence. First, objective ambivalence was measured
using two items assessing participants’ negative and positive
evaluations of each particular word and image independently
(Kaplan, 1972). We asked participants to ignore their negative
(vs. positive) evaluations and rate how positive (vs. negative)
they thought the word/image was. The items read: “Think about
[stimulus word]. When you think about the positive (negative)
aspects, while ignoring the negative (positive) aspects, how
positive is your evaluation of this?” Participants gave their ratings
on a scale ranging from “not at all positive (negative)” to “very
positive (negative).” We calculated objective ambivalence using
the following formula: [(P + N)/2] – |P – N| (Thompson
et al., 1995). Participants’ scores on the objective ambivalent scale
could range from – 1.5 to 4, where higher scores reﬂect more
ambivalence.
Second, participants’ subjective ambivalence was measured
with one item: “To what degree do you experience conﬂicting
thoughts and/or feelings regarding this?” The nine-point answer
scales ranged from “no conﬂicting thoughts and feelings at all”
to “maximum conﬂicting thoughts and feelings” (cf. Priester and
Petty, 1996).
Third, we measured participants’ aﬀective ambivalence toward
the attitude objects using the evaluative space grid (ESG: Larsen
et al., 2009). The evaluative space grid allows participants to
indicate their positive and negative evaluations on a 5 × 5 grid,
using the X-axis to indicate positivity and the Y-axis to indicate
negativity. The question on the X-axis was: “How positive do you
feel about this”? The question on the Y-axis was: “How negative
do you feel about this?” The cells on the axes were labeled as
“not at all positive (vs. negative)” to “very positive (vs. negative).”
Overall scores were calculated with the formula: [(P + N)/2] –
|P – N|. Participants’ scores on the ESG could range from – 1
to 5, with higher scores reﬂecting more ambivalence in aﬀective
responses toward the objects.
Results and Discussion
Due to a technical error, the data of one participant were lost.
One participant did not provide any self-report ratings. To reduce
the inﬂuence of outlier responses, latencies under 300 ms as well
as above 3,000 ms (1.9% of trials; cf. Bargh et al., 1992; de Liver
et al., 2007) and errors (i.e., positive responses to negative stimuli
and negative responses to positive stimuli, 0.9% of trials) were
removed from the dataset.
Ambivalence
Paired sample t-tests showed that for objective ambivalence,
ambivalent stimuli had higher scores (M = 1.76 SD= 0.81) than
univalent stimuli (M= 0.11, SD= 0.54), t(47)= 13.90, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.80, Cohen’s dz = 2.01, 95% CI [1.51–2.50]. The same
was true for subjective ambivalence (M = 5.28, SD = 1.43 vs.
M = 2.32, SD = 1.40), t(47) = 12.65, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.77,
Cohen’s dz = 1.83, 95% CI [1.36–2.29] and aﬀective ambivalence
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(M = 1.63, SD = 1.05 vs. M = –0.32, SD = 0.65), t(47) = 13.63,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.80, Cohen’s dz = 1.97, 95% CI [1.48–2.45].
Pull
As predicted, participants’ mouse trajectories showed a greater
pull toward the opposite evaluation when they evaluated
ambivalent (M = 0.55, SD = 0.31) rather than univalent stimuli
(M= 0.33, SD= 0.23), t(48)= 6.19, p< 0.001, η2p= 0.44, Cohen’s
dz = 0.88, 95% CI [0.55, 1.21], resulting in a larger curve (see
Figure 1)
Moreover, the moment at which the pull of the opposing
evaluation was largest, occurred later for ambivalent stimuli
(M = 832.75, SD = 182.78) than for univalent stimuli
(M = 702.74, SD = 128.79), t(48) = 5.92, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.42,
Cohen’s dz = 0.85, 95% CI [0.52, 1.17].
Response Times
Responses were faster in the second than in the ﬁrst block;
however, the pattern of results was the same and we collapsed
the data over blocks. Replicating numerous previous ﬁndings
(e.g., Fazio et al., 1986; Bargh et al., 1992; van Harreveld et al.,
2004), participants were slower when they evaluated ambivalent
(M = 1475.31, SD = 220.36) rather than univalent stimuli
(M = 1270.63, SD = 176.01), t(48) = 6.59, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.48,
Cohen’s dz = 0.94, 95% CI [0.60, 1.28]. More important, response
times did not correlate with pull, r(49) = −0.076, p = 0.604,
and when diﬀerences in pull between ambivalent and univalent
stimuli were entered as a covariate, the eﬀect of ambivalence on
response times remained signiﬁcant, F(1,47) = 7.04, p = 0.011
This suggests that the longer reaction times observed for
ambivalent stimuli are not solely attributable to the pull between
evaluations and may also be inﬂuenced by other factors.
Additional Analyses
Themeasure of pull did not correlate with self-report measures of
ambivalence. Because we orthogonally manipulated ambivalence,
FIGURE 1 | Mean mouse trajectories in the evaluation task, averaged
over ambivalent and univalent stimuli. In this figure, all trajectories are
mapped rightward to allow comparison.
perhaps reducing variance, we separately examined correlations
between our measures for ambivalent and univalent stimuli.
These analyses did not reveal signiﬁcant relations between
the response times and pull on the one side, and self-report
measures of ambivalence on the other side. This is surprising
because earlier work (e.g., Bargh et al., 1992) has found
correlations between objective ambivalence and response times,
although these studies did not manipulate, but rather measured
ambivalence.
Finally, exploratory analyses showed that for ambivalent
stimuli, trajectories showed more directional reversals over both
the horizontal axis (i.e., x-ﬂips;M= 6.82, SD= 1.55 vs.M= 6.21,
SD = 1.33, respectively, t(47) = 2.76, p = 0.008, η2p = 0.17,
Cohen’s dz = 0.40, 95% CI [0.10, 0.69]) and the vertical axis of the
screen (i.e., y-ﬂips;M = 5.89, SD= 1.55 vs.M = 5.04, SD= 1.23,
respectively, t(47)= 4.01, p< 0.001, η2p= 0.28, Cohen’s dz= 0.58,
95% CI [0.27, 0.88]) indicating that they were somewhat more
complex (Freeman and Ambady, 2010). Although both x-ﬂips
(r = 0.49, p < 0.001) and y-ﬂips (r = 0.68, p < 0.001) correlated
with our measure of pull, entering them as covariates did not alter
our patterns of results and the eﬀect of valence on pull remained
intact.
Conclusion
As hypothesized, during evaluation of ambivalent attitude
objects, pull toward the non-chosen evaluation was greater than
during the evaluation of univalent attitude objects, indicating that
ambivalence literally pulls people in two directions. Shedding
more light on the unfolding of ambivalence during evaluation,
we also found that maximum conﬂict occurred later in time
for ambivalent evaluations, compared to univalent evaluations.
Additionally, we replicated the eﬀect of ambivalence on response
times (Fazio et al., 1986; Bargh et al., 1992; van Harreveld et al.,
2004). However, response time did not correlate with amount
of pull nor with self-report measures of ambivalence. Self-report
also did not correlate with pull. This could mean that slower
responses to ambivalent stimuli do not only reﬂect the conﬂict
associated with ambivalence. We will return to this matter in
the Section “General Discussion.” Finally, exploratory analyses
showed ambivalent stimuli elicited more reversals in trajectories
than univalent stimuli, a possible indication that evaluating these
stimuli is more complex.
Study 2
Study 2 replicates and extends the ﬁrst study by examining
the process of evaluating health-related ambivalent attitude
objects. Unhealthy eating and drinking behavior are known to
be strong elicitors of ambivalence (Sparks et al., 2001; Conner
and Sparks, 2002); therefore we used palatable but unhealthy
foods and alcohol as ambivalent attitude objects and healthy
foods and orange juice as univalent attitude objects in Study 2.
These ambivalent and univalent stimuli are highly and similarly
familiar, which allowed us to rule out an alternative explanation
of Study 1, namely, that the ambivalent topics used there
(e.g., euthanasia) were simply harder to bring to mind than
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the univalent topics (e.g., sunshine) and hence caused slower
responses (c.f. Schwarz and Bohner, 2001).
Method
Participants and Design
Thirty-eight students (28 females, Mage = 22, SDage = 6)
participated for course credit or monetary reward. The
experiment was run at the end of an experimental hour and was
preceded by unrelated tasks. The experiment followed a one-
factor (valence; ambivalent vs. univalent) within-subjects design,
with pull (MD) as main dependent variable. All participants
signed an informed consent form.
Attitude Objects
In this study, we used images depicting diﬀerent kinds of foods
and beverages (for clarity we will refer to ‘foods’ for this category
throughout the manuscript). The ambivalent attitude objects
depicted: beer, a hamburger, chocolate, and fries. The univalent
attitude objects depicted vegetables, an apple, bread, and orange
juice, resulting in a total of eight trials. The attitude objects were
presented in random order. The images were acquired from the
Internet and, keeping original constraints, scaled to 300 pixels
wide and presented against a white background.
Measures and Procedure
The experiment was administered in the samemanner as Study 1,
using the same measures, with the exception that the location of
the response buttons on the screen was counterbalanced between
participants. All attitude objects were presented only once and
no habituation could ensue. Finally, the neutral practice trials
consisted of an image of baskets and an image of a gray desk
cabinet.
Results and Discussion
Responses under 300 ms and above 3,000 ms were removed from
the data (2.6%) as well as errors (i.e., negative responses to the
generally positive univalent stimuli, 1.6%; cf. de Liver et al., 2007).
Normalization and calculation of MD was done in the same
manner as in Study 1.
Ambivalence
Ambivalence scores were higher for ambivalent attitude objects
than for univalent attitude objects on objective ambivalence
(M = 1.77, SD = 1.01 vs. M = 0.51, SD = 0.79, respectively),
t(37) = 7.19, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.58, Cohen’s dz = 1.17, 95% CI
[0.75, 1.58], subjective ambivalence (M = 4.64, SD = 1.68 vs.
M = 2.34, SD = 1.33, respectively), t(37) = 7.26, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.59, Cohen’s dz = 1.18, 95% CI [0.76, 1.59], and aﬀective
ambivalence (M = 1.44, SD = 1.01 vs. M = –0.12, SD = 0.71,
respectively), t(37) = 8.36, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.65, Cohen’s
dz = 1.36, 95% CI [0.91, 1.79].
Pull
Conﬁrming our hypotheses, we found that pull was greater
for ambivalent attitude objects (M = 0.44, SD = 0.32)
than for univalent attitude objects (M = 0.25, SD = 0.25),
t(37) = 2.98, p = 0.005, η2p = 0.19, Cohen’s dz = 0.48, 95%
CI [0.14, 0.82]. Moreover, the moment at which the pull of the
opposing evaluation was largest, occurred later for ambivalent
stimuli (M = 868.27, SD = 263.62) than for univalent stimuli
(M = 674.30, SD = 187.84), t(37) = 5.65, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.46,
Cohen’s dz = 0.92, 95% CI [0.53–1.29]. These observations
replicate Study 1.
Response Times
The data revealed slower responses for ambivalent stimuli
(M = 1517.70, SD = 325.43) compared to univalent stimuli
(M = 1251.47, SD = 245.05), t(37) = 6.05, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.50,
Cohen’s dz = 0.98, 95% CI [0.59–1.37]. However, the response
times did not correlate with pull, r(38) = 0.082, p = 0.624, and
after entering the diﬀerence in pull as a covariate, the eﬀect of
valence on response times remained in tact, F(1,36) = 22.23,
p< 0.001. These observations further replicate Study 1.
Additional Analyses
Examining the correlations between the mouse tracker variables
and the self-report variables, we found that pull was positively
correlated with subjective ambivalence r(38) = 0.40, p = 0.012
and objective ambivalence, r(38) = 0.38, p = 0.021. Similar
correlations were found between response time and subjective
ambivalence r(38) = 0.38, p = 0.020, and objective ambivalence,
r(38) = 0.40, p = 0.012. Thus, self-reported based ambivalence
correlated positive with both pull and response time. However,
pull and response times were not correlated with each other
r(38) = 0.082, p = 0.624, indicating that they may be inﬂuenced
by diﬀerent aspects. Exploratory analyses showed that there were
no diﬀerences in reversals over either axes between ambivalent
and univalent stimuli, although both x-ﬂips (r = 0.45, p= 0.005)
and y-ﬂips (r = 0.50, p = 0.001) correlated with our measure of
pull.
Conclusion
The results of Study 2 replicated the core ﬁndings of Study 1.
Ambivalent objects were associated with stronger pull indicating
more ambivalence. Additionally, ambivalent and univalent
stimuli did not only diﬀer in amount of pull and magnitude
of curves, but also in the temporal unfolding. Finally, pull and
response time were not correlated.
However, the pattern of correlations between self-reported
and pull and response times diﬀered from Study 1, such
that subjective and objective ambivalence did have a positive
relationship with both the magnitude of pull as well as the time
people took to respond. These diﬀerences across studies may
be due to diﬀerences between the stimuli used (abortion and
euthanasia in Study 1; foods in Study 2). To test this possibility
we directly compared the two types of stimuli in one design in
Study 3.
Study 3
In Study 3, we used the attitude objects from Study 2 (foods) and
Study 1 (abstract topics) in a single design. To make sure that
possible diﬀerences were not due to mode of presentation (i.e.,
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Study 1 stimuli presented as words vs. Study 2 stimuli presented
as images) we now presented the attitude objects from Study 2
also as words. Thus, instead of showing a picture of a hamburger,
we now presented the word “hamburger.” Second, because one of
the attitude objects in the category foods was “beer,” we decided
to drop “alcohol” from the Study 1 attitude objects, to prevent
stimulus overlap.
Method
Participants and Design
Forty-ﬁve students (29 females, 1 unreported, Mage = 21,
SDage = 3) participated for course credit or monetary reward.
The experiment followed a two-factor (valence; ambivalent vs.
univalent, topic; foods vs. abstract) within subjects design with
pull (MD) as main dependent variable. All participants signed an
informed consent form.
Attitude Objects
In this experiment, we used attitude objects from both previous
studies, resulting in 17 trials (7 ambivalent, 10 univalent, see
below). From Study 1, we took the ambivalent abstract topics:
abortion, euthanasia, and organ donation (we had only three
stimuli here, because we dropped alcohol from this category, as it
would already appear in the food stimuli category as “beer”). The
univalent abstract topics were: depressed, abuse, unhappy, happy,
sun, and holiday. We used the same food stimuli as in Study 2.
The ambivalent food stimuli were: beer, hamburger, chocolate,
and fries with sauce1. The univalent food stimuli were: vegetables,
apple, bread, and orange juice (as in Study 2).
Measures and Procedure
The experiment was run in the same manner as Studies 1 and 2,
using the same measurements.
Results and Discussion
One participant did not provide data on the self-report measures.
Responses given under 300 ms as well as above 3,000 ms were
removed from the data (3.5%) as well as errors (i.e., positive
1In the Netherlands, it is customary to eat fries with some sort of sauce. Mayonnaise
is usually the sauce of choice (in fact, to the degree that “fries with,” would
automatically denote mayonnaise), but other common favorites include, but are
not limited to, “special” (mixture of mayonnaise, ketchup, and raw onions), “war”
(mixture of mayonnaise, peanut sauce, and raw onions), and “joppie” (secret
recipe, but presumably a mixture of red curry, yellow curry, mayonnaise, sugar,
and raw onions). Because some people do not like mayonnaise, but instead prefer
for instance, peanut sauce or ketchup, we chose to use the addition “with sauce”
to mean fries with some form of relatively greasy sauce, regardless of the precise
contents, but applicable to the preference of our participants.
responses to negative stimuli and negative responses to positive
stimuli, 0.4%; cf. de Liver et al., 2007). Normalization and
calculation of MD was done in the same manner as in Studies
1 and 2.
Ambivalence
Ambivalent attitude objects were more ambivalent compared
to univalent attitude objects for objective ambivalence,
F(1,43) = 110.36, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.72, Cohen’s dz = 1.55,
95% CI [1.11, 1.98], subjective ambivalence, F(1,43) = 112.54,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.72, Cohen’s dz = 1.60, 95% CI [1.15, 2.04], and
aﬀective ambivalence, F(1,43) = 168.68, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.80,
Cohen’s dz = 1.96, 95% CI [1.45, 2.56], see Table 1 for means.
There was also an interaction between topic and valence,
such that for the aﬀective ambivalence measure, the eﬀect was
stronger for abstract topics, compared to foods, F(1,43) = 25.39,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.37. There was no main eﬀect of topic.
Pull
Repeated measures analyses with valence (ambivalent vs.
univalent) and topic (abstract vs. foods) as within-subjects factor
and MD as dependent variable showed a main eﬀect of topic and
valence (see Table 2 for relevant means). Results also showed
an interaction between topic and valence. As expected, pull was
stronger for ambivalent attitude objects, compared to univalent
attitude objects, F(1,44) =67.98, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.61, Cohen’s
dz = 1.24, 95% CI [0.85–1.63]. This means that participants
showed stronger pull toward the non-choice option for the
ambivalent attitude objects (M = 0.48, SD = 0.25) compared
to the univalent attitude objects (M = 0.19, SD = 0.17).
The moment of greatest pull also occurred later in time for
ambivalent attitude objects (M= 951.60, SD= 236.80) compared
to the univalent attitude objects (M = 704.97, SD = 140.28),
F(1,44) = 121.76, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.74, Cohen’s dz = 1.65,
95% CI [1.19–2.09] again indicating a temporal diﬀerence in the
unfolding of ambivalence. These observations replicate Studies 1
and 2.
The main eﬀect of topic revealed that pull was greater for
abstract topics (M = 0.47, SD = 0.25) compared to foods
(M = 0.20, SD = 0.19), F(1,44) = 40.50, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.48,
Cohen’s dz = 0.95, 95% CI [0.59–1.30] and that the moment of
greatest pull occurred later in time for ambivalent abstract topics
(M = 872.85, SD= 183.47) compared to the foods (M = 783.72,
SD = 203.64), F(1,44) = 16.81, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.28, Cohen’s
dz = 0.61, 95% CI [0.30–0.93].
Finally, there was an interaction between valence and topic
such that the main eﬀect of valence was also somewhat stronger
TABLE 1 | Study 3 mean ambivalent ratings for objective, subjective and affective ambivalence for ambivalent vs. univalent stimuli, for abstract topics,
foods, and overall.
Objective Ambivalence Subjective Ambivalence Affective Ambivalence
Ambivalent Univalent Ambivalent Univalent Ambivalent Univalent
Overall 1.51 (0.87) 0.18 (0.62) 3.74 (1.34) 2.02 (0.86) 1.23 (0.98) –0.16 (0.64)
Abstract topics 1.59 (0.92) 0.13 (0.63) 3.77 (1.95) 2.20 (1.35) 1.43 (1.12) –0.46 (0.71)
Foods 1.43 (1.13) 0.23 (0.77) 3.72 (1.85) 1.84 (0.86) 1.03 (1.21) 0.13 (0.74)
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TABLE 2 | Study 3 means (SD) for maximum deviation (MD), response time
(RT), and maximum deviation time (MDT) for ambivalent vs. univalent
stimuli, for abstract topics and foods separately.
Abstract Topics Foods
Ambivalent Univalent Ambivalent Univalent
MD 0.70 (0.38) 0.23 (0.21) 0.26 (0.24) 0.14 (0.23)
RT 1737.01
(354.71)
1237.29
(206.13)
1388.71
(306.11)
1244.66
(263.83)
MDT 1063.11
(286.33)
682.58
(128.29)
840.08
(244.26)
727.35
(185.61)
for abstract topics, compared to foods, F(1,44)= 31.23, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.42. With regard to moment of occurrence of greatest pull,
the interaction indicated that in general people were slower for
abstract topics than food when it came to ambivalent stimuli,
but this pattern was not statistically signiﬁcant by conventional
standards (p = 0.055) for the univalent stimuli (a similar pattern
was found for response times overall, see below), F(1,44)= 40.75,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.48.
Response Times
A main eﬀect of valence showed slower responses for ambivalent
stimuli (M = 1562.85, SD = 291.46) compared to univalent
stimuli (M = 1240.98, SD= 224.32), F(1,44)= 170.40, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.80, Cohen’s dz = 1.95, 95% CI [1.44, 2.44]. This replicates
Studies 1 and 2 as well as earlier research. There was also a main
eﬀect of topic, showing that people were slower in responding
to the abstract topics (M = 1487.15, SD = 255.33) than to
food stimuli (M = 1316.68, SD = 270.88), F(1,44) = 38.50,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.48, Cohen’s dz = 0.93, 95% CI [0.57–1.27].
Finally, there was also an interaction between topic and valence,
F(1,44) = 52.49, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.54, qualifying the main eﬀect
of topic such that for ambivalent stimuli, people were slower
for abstract topics, but for univalent stimuli there was no such
diﬀerence.
Additional Analyses
Overall, response times correlated marginally negatively with
pull, r(45) = –0.28, p = 0.066. As in Studies 1 and 2, entering
diﬀerences in MD as a covariate still left an eﬀect of valence
on RT, F(1,43) = 50.49, p < 0.001. Furthermore, the data
showed a positive correlation between subjective ambivalence
and amount of pull, r(44) = 0.34, p = 0.024, but no other
correlations were statistically signiﬁcant. When conducting the
same analyses on abstract topics and foods separately, there were
no signiﬁcant correlations between the measures. Exploratory
analyses showed that for trajectories for ambivalent stimuli
showed more directional reversals over both the horizontal axis
(i.e., x-ﬂips; M = 7.03, SD = 1.81 vs. M = 6.44, SD = 1.74,
respectively, F(1,44) = 5.41, p = 0.025, η2p = 0.11, Cohen’s
dz = 0.47, 95% CI [0.16, 0.78]) and the vertical axis of the
screen (i.e., y-ﬂips; M = 5.75, SD = 1.74 vs. M = 5.23,
SD = 1.38, respectively, F(1,44) = 10.13, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.19,
Cohen’s dz = 0.49, 95% CI [0.17, 0.79]) indicating that they
were somewhat more complex (Freeman and Ambady, 2010).
Although x-ﬂips correlated with the measure of pull (r = 0.32,
p = 0.03), entering these, or y-ﬂips, as covariates did not alter
our patterns of results and the eﬀect of valence on pull remained
intact.
Food vs. Abstract Topics
Although, overall, we obtained the same pattern of results for
both foods and abstract topics, eﬀect sizes between studies
diﬀered. To investigate whether these signify a structural
diﬀerence between these topic domains we compared size of the
eﬀect of our manipulation for foods vs. abstract topics for all our
measures. First, we calculated eﬀect sizes for foods and abstract
topics separately in Study 3. We then calculated a point estimate
for each index and topic domain separately and tested whether
the point estimates diﬀered signiﬁcantly (see Table 3). These
analyses showed that there was a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in eﬀect sizes for pull (MD) over studies, such that eﬀects
were stronger for abstract topics compared to food. There was
a marginally signiﬁcant diﬀerence on the measure of objective
ambivalence, showing stronger eﬀects for abstract topics.
Pictures vs. Words
In addition, the data of Study 2 and the food conditions of Study
3 can be brought to bear on whether pictures of foods or words
describing foods are more likely to elicit ambivalence. Although
both studies presented the same attitude objects, the visual
presentation of foods caused stronger eﬀects on the subjective
measure of ambivalence, (point estimate = 1.75, 95% CI [1.28,
2.22]) than the presentation of food words (point estimate= 1.08,
CI [0.71, 1.46], t(1) = 4.77, p = 0.029. None of the other indices
showed diﬀerences in eﬀect size (all p’s> 0.47).
Conclusion
As expected, we found that evaluating ambivalent attitude
objects, compared to univalent attitude objects, caused more
pull toward the non-chosen option, both for abstract topics and
foods. Additionally, the moment of maximum pull occurred
later for ambivalent attitude objects. These ﬁndings replicate
the eﬀect found in Studies 1 and 2. We also replicated the
eﬀect of valence on response times – ambivalent evaluations
took longer. Pull was also positively correlated with subjective
ambivalence. Comparing eﬀect sizes across studies, we found
TABLE 3 | Point estimates [95% CI] for effect sizes for objective,
subjective, and affective ambivalence, response times (RT), curvature
(MD), and moment of occurrence of maximum conflict (MD time).
Abstract Topics Foods t df p
Objective
ambivalence
1.66 [1.11, 2.22] 1.08 [0.81, 1.34] 3.47 1 0.06
Subjective
ambivalence
1.35 [0.50, 2.19] 1.09 [0.82, 1.36] 0.33 1 0.57
Affective
ambivalence
1.62 [1.02, 2.21] 1.37 [0.73, 2.01] 0.32 1 0.57
RT 1.32 [0.47, 2.18] 0.85 [0.60, 1.10] 1.06 1 0.30
MD 1.05 [0.66, 1.44] 0.45 [0.23, 0.68] 6.64 1 0.01
MD time 1.15 [0.50, 1.80] 0.81 [0.56, 1.05] 0.94 1 0.33
Effect sizes pooled over topic domain (abstract topics vs. foods).
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that when it comes to diﬀerent topic domains, abstract topics
yield larger eﬀect sizes on pull of opposing evaluations and
objective ambivalence, but not on any of the other indices.
Finally, pictures of foods elicit somewhat stronger eﬀects on
subjective ambivalence compared to food words, but not on any
of the other indexes of ambivalence.
General Discussion
Ambivalence is a psychological state in which people are being
torn between “one side” and the “other side” when making
evaluations. This dynamic aspect of ambivalence is hard to
capture in response times or self-report based measures of
ambivalence. To gainmore insight into ambivalence as it unfolds,
we used an embodied measure of pull, drawing on research on
dynamic systems (Freeman and Ambady, 2009, 2010; Wojnowicz
et al., 2009; Freeman et al., 2011). In three studies, we tracked
participants’ mouse movements as they evaluated attitude objects
that varied in ambivalence.
Summary of Main Findings
Several ﬁndings are worth highlighting. First, our data show
that amount of pull as assessed with the embodied measure,
is sensitive to diﬀerences in ambivalence. When participants
evaluated an ambivalent attitude object, their mouse trajectories
showed more pull of the non-chosen option than when they
evaluated a univalent attitude object, revealing how they were
literally torn between two opposing evaluations. Second, the
temporal trajectory of the motor movements suggests that
the peak of experienced conﬂict, as indexed by the moment
of maximum pull, occurs later for ambivalent than for non-
ambivalent attitude objects. Thus, our work shows not only
a diﬀerence in degree of pull between opposing evaluations,
but also sheds light on its temporal unfolding. Finally, across
all three studies, we replicated earlier ﬁndings that evaluating
ambivalent attitude objects takes more time overall than
evaluating non-ambivalent attitude objects (Bargh et al., 1992;
van Harreveld et al., 2004). Notably, these diﬀerences in response
time remain, even when controlling for the conﬂict between
opposing evaluations as measured by pull, indicating that slower
evaluations may not be exclusively due to evaluative conﬂict.
Within cognitive psychology, longer response times have been
considered an indicator of cognitive competition and conﬂict
(e.g., MacLeod, 1991). Ambivalence researchers have followed
this convention, by assuming that longer response times to
ambivalent stimuli arise from competing evaluative responses,
which also need to be integrated for a ﬁnal answer (Bargh
et al., 1992; Bassili, 1996). Because we found variation in
the correlations between pull and response time, our ﬁndings
suggests that slower responses times may be, at least in part,
driven by other factors including consideration of a broader set of
attributes that may reduce the conﬂict and increased elaboration
(cf. Schwarz and Bohner, 2001; Schwarz, 2007), behavioral
inhibition due in response to conﬂict (Gray and McNaughton,
2000; Corr, 2013) or decreased positive aﬀect (Kuhl and Kazen,
1999).
Future Research
In the present studies ambivalence was not experimentally
manipulated and, instead, we used pre-selected materials.
One might argue that our stimuli also diﬀered on other
dimensions than just ambivalence, for instance familiarity.
However, our materials were all based on previous research
into ambivalence and have been tried and tested in an
array of studies (Sparks et al., 2001; van Harreveld et al.,
2009a, 2014; Schneider et al., 2013). Furthermore, the measure
of pull we used is a very close operationalization of the
theoretical conceptualization of ambivalence in the literature.
More importantly, participants indicated being ambivalent about
our stimuli, making ambivalence at least a salient diﬀerence,
albeit possibly not the only one. Thus, we believe that our results
are very much tied to diﬀerences in ambivalence. Nevertheless,
future research could experimentally manipulate ambivalence, by
for instance introducing new (neutral) attitude objects that vary
only on this dimension. Such research may provide additional
empirical insight into convergent and divergent validity of mouse
tracking measure for the purpose of assessing ambivalence.
It is worth noting that we found some variation in the
relationship between pull and self-report based measures of
ambivalence. Ambivalence is theoretically conceptualized as a
state of evaluative conﬂict, caused by simultaneous activation
of opposing evaluations (e.g., Meehl, 1964 [in Emmons, 1996];
Kaplan, 1972; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Thompson et al.,
1995; Wegener et al., 1995; Priester and Petty, 1996; van
Harreveld et al., 2009b; Petty et al., 2012). As noted above,
our measure of pull presumably taps into exactly this conﬂict
(cf. Freeman and Ambady, 2010, for an in depth discussion of
mouse tracking). However, the variation in correlations with
self-reports suggests that people are not always aware of the
dynamic tug-of-war between opposing evaluations. For instance,
in Study 2 and 3, measures of pull correlated positively with
subjective ambivalence, such that the stronger the experience
of ambivalence, the stronger the pull. However this correlation
was not statistically signiﬁcant in Study 1. Furthermore, objective
ambivalence related signiﬁcantly to pull only in Study 2. Based on
this, we believe that the mouse trajectory measure taps in to the
subjective experience of ambivalence mostly, albeit not always.
This raises the question which factors inﬂuence the strength of
the relationship between self-report based and implicit measures
of ambivalence, and under what conditions measures of pull
correlate with self-report based measures, and under which they
do not.
Previous work has addressed a similar question with regard
to relatively low correlations between diﬀerent self-report based
measures of ambivalence. Measures of subjective and objective
ambivalence generally show only moderate correlations (e.g.,
Thompson et al., 1995; Priester and Petty, 1996) and the
magnitude of this correlation varies over studies. Addressing
this, researchers found that correlations between the two are
high when ambivalence is made salient (a situational factor),
or when participants have a strong preference for consistency
(an individual diﬀerence variable), (Newby-Clark et al., 2002).
Similar avenues of research may focus on when self-report based
measures of ambivalence correlate strongly with implicit indices,
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and when they do not (see also Koole et al., 2001, on the relation
between implicit and explicit measures in the domain of self-
esteem), and to what degree they relate to established ﬁndings in
the literature on the consequences of ambivalence.
A notable ﬁnding from our exploratory analyses showed
that, at least for Studies 1 and 3, trajectories were more
complex as a function of ambivalence. This suggests that
online experiences of ambivalence are an important factor in
the driving and altering of response planning and execution.
Future work might extend these preliminary ﬁndings and further
understanding of the embodied consequences of ambivalence.
It is also worth exploring whether diﬀerent types of ambivalent
attitudes unfold diﬀerently over time. Conceptually, diﬀerent
types of ambivalence can be distinguished. Intracomponent
ambivalence refers to ambivalence as the result of conﬂicting
cognitions (cognitive/cognitive conﬂict) or conﬂicting aﬀective
responses (aﬀective/aﬀective conﬂict), (van Harreveld et al.,
2009b). Intercomponent ambivalence, or aﬀective–cognitive
ambivalence, refers to ambivalence as the result of conﬂict
between cognitions and aﬀective responses (Lavine et al., 1998;
Maio et al., 2000). Another distinction can be made between
ambivalence based on mostly “cold” arguments or more “hot”
aﬀective responses, or even mixed emotions (i.e., emotional
ambivalence; e.g., Larsen et al., 2001; Fong, 2006; Rees et al.,
2013). Paralleling this, ambivalent trajectories might unfold
diﬀerently as a result of individual diﬀerences (e.g., self-control
and conﬂicted feelings toward certain foods; Gillebaart et al.,
submited).
Our work shows that ambivalence is readily captured in
mouse movements. Together with previous work on whole body
movement and ambivalence (Schneider et al., 2013), this suggests
that ambivalence has an overt visible quality. Work on grasping
behaviors has shown that observers are able diﬀerentiate actors
intentions based on the kinematics of the actors’ movement
(Becchio et al., 2008, 2012). Relating this to the current ﬁndings,
observers may be able to infer actors’ ambivalence, purely from
watching their body movements.
Finally, given that ambivalence has important consequences
for information processing (e.g., Maio et al., 1996; Jonas et al.,
1997; Fong, 2006; Nordgren et al., 2006; Rees et al., 2013; van
Harreveld et al., 2014) and behavior (e.g., Lipkus et al., 2001;
Priester, 2002; Berndsen et al., 2004; Costarelli and Colloca,
2004), the question becomes whether and when pull or self-report
based measures of ambivalence better predict these outcomes.
Research has shown for instance, that implicit ambivalence has
consequences for behavior, even though people do not report
on it (Petty et al., 2012). In view of these ﬁndings, future
research may examine if amount of pull is a better predictor
of downstream consequences of ambivalence than self-reported
ambivalence.
Conclusion
In the present work, we took a ﬁrst step in assessing ambivalence
through an embodied measure of pull between opposing
evaluations. We found that the measure of pull is sensitive to
manipulations of ambivalence, showing that people are torn
between evaluations when evaluating an ambivalent attitude
object. Pull was mostly positively correlated with self-reports
of subjective ambivalence. However, it was not consistently
related to objective ambivalence and response time, suggesting
that there is more to ambivalence than these measures capture.
Future research should further address the degree to which the
measure of pull diﬀerentially relates to self-report measures and
predicts diﬀerent outcomes. The embodied approach used here
adds to the methodological repertoire that researchers can draw
on to further unravel the dynamic and multifaceted nature of
ambivalence.
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